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Abstract
International nuclear safeguards inspectors do not have a method to verify
the contents of sealed storage casks containing spent reactor fuel. The heavy
shielding that is used to limit radiation emission attenuates and scatters
photons and neutrons emitted by the fuel, and thereby hinders inspection
with these probes. This problem is especially pressing given the policy
decisions of several nations to begin permanent disposal of spent fuel in
deep geological repositories. Radiography with cosmic-ray muons provides
a potential solution, as muons are able to penetrate the cask and fuel and
provide information on the cask contents. Here we show in simulation that
muon scattering radiography can be used to inspect the contents of sealed
geological storage casks, and can discern between a variety of plausible
diversion scenarios. This technique can be applied immediately prior to
permanent interment in a geological repository, giving inspectors a final
opportunity to verify State declarations of spent fuel disposal.
Keywords: cosmic-ray muon radiography, dry cask storage, safeguards,
geological repository, spent fuel, LA-UR-XX-XXXX
1. Introduction
The lack of options for the final disposal of highly radioactive spent nu-
clear fuel remains a challenge to the nuclear power industry. Multiple coun-
tries are now considering permanent disposal of waste deep underground
in geological repositories. Finland and Sweden will open the first geologi-
cal repositories for high-level waste, which are expected to begin accepting
spent reactor fuel assemblies in the 2020s and 2030s, respectively [1–3].
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The spent fuel will be encapsulated within heavily shielded copper and iron
containers [4], and then transferred to these facilities for permanent under-
ground interment.
In most nations, fissile material is monitored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), which has the responsibility under the Treaty on
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to implement nuclear safeguards in
non-nuclear-weapons states [5]. Spent nuclear fuel rods contain plutonium
that is created via neutron capture on uranium nuclei during reactor oper-
ations, which is categorized as irradiated direct use material by the IAEA
[6] and thereby falls under safeguards. The IAEA monitors and inventories
fuel through all steps of the nuclear fuel cycle, including final disposal. Safe-
guards are terminated when nuclear material is “practically irrecoverable,”
subject to agreements between the IAEA and the State under safeguards [7].
Spent fuel that is buried in a repository may meet that criterion. Therefore,
a final verification after encapsulation and immediately preceding burial is
the last chance for inspectors to evaluate state declarations of spent fuel
disposal.
Previous studies on verifying the content of metallic dry storage casks
via measurements of neutrons and photons which escape the cask shielding
has shown that these probes cannot provide sufficient information to de-
termine if fuel has been removed from the center of the cask [8–11]. More
recent work has shown that the neutron deficit, following the removal of
low-burnup bundles, can be obscured by replacing some of them with high-
burnup fuel with a larger neutron emission rate [12]. Recognizing this un-
solved problem in nuclear safeguards, the IAEA 2018 Long Term R&D plan
lists the development of “safeguards equipment to establish and maintain
knowledge of spent fuel in shielding/storage/transport containers” as a Top
Priority R&D need [13].
Cosmic-ray muon scattering radiography presents an alternate method
for investigating cask contents. Muons are a highly penetrating and pas-
sive probe that is capable of penetrating storage cask’s shielding and in-
terrogating the fuel assemblies inside. There have been explorations of
various nuclear waste assessment scenarios via simulation [14–27], and a re-
cent statistics-limited measurement proved that cosmic-ray muon scattering
measurements are sensitive to removal of fuel assemblies from a sealed dry
storage cask [28].
In this paper, we discuss simulations of cosmic ray muon scattering in a
storage cask containing spent reactor fuel, using a realistic cask design that
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will be used in the Finnish and Swedish repositories, realistic fuel designs,
and a simulated detector with realistic angular resolution. We consider sev-
eral different diversion scenarios: a single missing fuel assembly, half a miss-
ing fuel assembly, and replacement of a spent fuel assembly with a dummy
assembly made of lead. This work shows that a muon tracking detector
with reasonable angular resolution can distinguish these diversion scenarios
from a completely full storage cask with high confidence by recording 24
hours of cosmic-ray muon data. Such a system could be built using existing
technology, and could potentially provide a method for final verification of
encapsulated spent fuel before permanent disposal.
2. Simulation Setup
The GEANT4 toolkit [29] is used to simulate muon passage through fuel
casks. The simulated cask geometry follows the description of the actual
casks that will be used in the Finnish and Swedish repositories found in [4],
which includes specifications for both pressurized water reactor (PWR) and
boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel casks. Both cask designs are cylinders
composed of an interior cast iron insert with slots to accommodate the
fuel assemblies, surrounded by a copper shell to act as a barrier against
corrosion. The cast iron insert has a diameter of 95 cm and the copper shell
has a thickness of 5 cm, giving the cask an outer diameter of 1.05 m. The
cask length is 4.835 m. The insert for PWR assemblies has four 26×26 cm2
slots spaced in an array with 37 cm separation from center to center. Inserts
for BWR assemblies have twelve 18× 18 cm2 slots spaced in an array with
21 cm separation from center to center. A cross section of the BWR cask
with fuel is shown in Fig. 1a. In this paper, we consider the BWR cask, as
the reduced fuel size and larger number of fuel bundles in the cask (relative
to the PWR cask) make this a more challenging verification scenario. It
is reasonable to assume that the analysis discussed here would also apply
to PWR casks, where the number of fuel bundle assemblies is reduced and
their size is increased.
The simulated BWR fuel assemblies are 10 × 10 bundles of individual
fuel rods with a cross-sectional area of 16×16 cm2. Each assembly contains
92 UO2 fuel rods and two water rods. The fuel rods have a radius of 4.775
mm and an outer cladding layer of zirconium alloy that is 0.71 mm thick.
The water rods are composed of a hollow zirconium alloy tube, 0.71 mm
thick with an outer radius of 12.725 mm. The 10× 10 array of fuel rods are
encased in a square 10 mm thick aluminum shell. The assemblies do not
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Figure 1: a) Cross-section of the simulated storage cask filled with 10 × 10 BWR fuel
bundles. The red circles represent fuel rods and the blue circles represent water rods. b)
Top-down view of the simulated detector plane over the cask.
vary along their 3.85 m length. All fuel assemblies were placed inside of the
fuel cask with identical orientation, as a 90◦ rotation of a fuel bundle has
no effect on the muon scattering signal.
The BWR fuel cask simulations are broken in to five scenarios: a full
cask (nominal scenario), an empty cask, a cask with one missing bundle, a
cask with one half missing bundle (half of the fuel rods removed from one
side), and a cask with one fuel bundle replaced with lead (UO2 replaced
with Pb rods), see Fig. 2. For each scenario, two horizontal detector planes
are used to simulate muon tracking detectors above and below the cask,
with the cask placed horizontally between them. The detector planes are
aligned horizontally and separated vertically by 1.5 m. Each detector has
dimensions of 4 meters along the length of the cask and 2 meters along its
width, see Fig. 1b.
The momentum and angular distributions of the simulated muons are
randomly sampled from Reyna’s parameterized distribution described in
[30]. Only muons which pass through both detectors and the cask or within
5 cm of its edge were put through the full simulation chain. In order to
include realistic detector resolution effects, each muon’s incoming and out-
going directional vectors were given a Gaussian blur, giving the detector a
limiting resolution of 10 milliradians on the muon scattering angle. Each
data set consisted of 2.33 ×107 generated muons, which corresponds to
approximately 12 hours counting time for this detector geometry.
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Figure 2: The diversion scenarios considered in this study. From left to right: a com-
pletely empty cask, a cask with one missing assembly, a cask with half of one assembly
missing, and a cask where an assembly has been replaced by a dummy assembly contain-
ing lead in place of UO2 fuel.
3. Analysis and Discussion
Here we describe two different analysis techniques applied to the sim-
ulated data. First, we perform a straightforward analysis comparing the
muon scattering angles in a full cask with the various diversion scenarios,
using 24 hours worth of simulated data on a static cask. In the second
technique, we consider two 12 hour data sets, where the cask is rotated 90◦
about its central axis in between measurements. From this, we construct a
sinogram with limited angular coverage and use it to constrain a model of
the cask contents.
3.1. Scattering Angle Analysis
A virtual tally plane is created at the center of the cask. The plane has
a width of 1.2 m and length of 3 m, and is divided into 2 cm wide pixels
that run the length of the plane. Since each fuel cask is uniform along its
long axis along within the length of the fuel bundles, segmentation along
this direction is not required. Each pixel has a corresponding histogram for
recording muon scattering angles.
The array of BWR fuel bundles inside the cask is divided into columns
across the width of the cask, with the two outer columns having two fuel
assemblies, and the two inner bundles having four fuel assemblies in the
nominal case of a full cask. Muon tracks in the upper simulated detector
are given a Gaussian blur and then projected to the center of the cask.
If the muon intersects the virtual tally plane, and does not cross between
fuel bundle columns, the corresponding histogram of the intersected pixel is
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filled with the scattering angle, which is measured by comparing the muon’s
blurred incident and blurred exiting tracks.
The average value of the muon scattering angle in each histogram (θscat)
is calculated for each pixel, for each simulated scenario. The ratio of θscat
of each diversion scenario to that of a full fuel cask along the width of the
cask is plotted in Fig. 3 for 24 hrs counting time (using two independent
12 hr data sets). The horizontal lines indicate the 2 cm width of each pixel
and the vertical lines show the statistical uncertainty of the calculated ratio.
A black line at unity is shown to represent the expectation of comparisons
with a full cask.
The muon scattering ratio for a completely empty cask is obviously
different from the expected ratio for a full cask by up to 48 σ. For the
diversion scenarios, the muon scattering ratio is consistent with the expected
ratio for the first column. The second and fourth columns also show muon
scattering ratios that are consistent with the expected ratio, save for the
few centimeters closest to the third column. In the third column, where the
defect in the cask loading is located, the divergence of the muon scattering
ratio for a single fuel bundle removed reaches 11.2σ away from that expected
for a full cask, while the ratio for a half bundle removed reaches 8.3σ.
The muon scattering ratio for replacement of a fuel bundle with lead is
slightly above one, due to the shorter radiation length X0 for lead than
UO2, which are 0.56 cm and 0.61 cm, respectively. However, the significance
of this signal is under 2σ in each individual bin from the expected ratio
for a full cask, precluding definitive statements about replacement in this
measurement scenario.
3.2. Model Fitting Analysis
A second analysis is performed to investigate the sensitivity in the muon
scattering signal to the replacement of spent fuel with lead, using the model
fitting techniques first described in [31], but with limited angular coverage.
Additional simulated data sets representing 12 hours of counting time are
produced with the cask rotated 90◦ about its central axis. The simulated
data set for one 12 hr counting period in the initial configuration was com-
bined with one 12 hr counting period after rotation, creating a 24 hr data
set. Rather than projecting the muon tracks to a single tally plane at
the cask’s center, each track was projected to hit a tally plane to which
the incident muon track was approximately normal. Each tally plane also
passed through the cask’s center, with 1◦ offsets between them and pixel
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Figure 3: The ratio of θscat for each diversion scenario to that of a full cask, for the
various diversion scenarios. The shaded regions indicate the locations of fuel bundle
columns (containing 2, 4, 4, and 2 fuel assemblies form left to right).
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divisions of 2 cm along the width of the cask. The corresponding scatter-
ing histograms for each pixel were fit with the multigroup method (see [32]
for details), which provides an estimate of the number of radiation lengths
that the muons in the histogram had traversed. This information is used
to construct a sinogram of the fuel cask, shown in Fig. 4, as described in
[24]. Each sinogram element represents the number of radiation lengths
that muons, with an offset ρ from the cask’s center and a rotation ϕ about
the cask’s central axis, pass through when traversing in the cask. Here, due
to the fact that muons are sampled in a limited range of zenith angles set
by the detector geometry, there is only partial angular coverage of the fuel
cask.
Figure 4: A partial sinogram of a full fuel cask created from two 12 hour counting time
data sets, separated by a 90◦ rotation. The sinograms had 60, 2 cm divisions along the
cask width (ρ) and 360, 1◦ divisions in rotation about the central axis of the cask (ϕ).
Black indicates regions where no scattering data was collected.
We define a model of the cask using its component parts: the copper
shell, the cast iron insert, and the 12 fuel assemblies that should be present
in a full cask. In this simplified cask model, each element in the partially
filled sinogram can be represented as
si =
∑
k∈ri
pkiak, (1)
where si is the value in the sinogram defined by ray ri, pki is the path length
of ri through model element k, and ak is the scattering density of the cask
model element k. Fig. 5 shows the geometry of the cask model with a ray
corresponding to a sinogram element.
The goal is now to find the individual values ak corresponding to each of
the 14 cask elements, which are numbered as shown in Fig. 5. From these
8
Figure 5: The BWR cask model with the numbered model elements and ray ri passing
through at angle ϕ with offset ρ from the cask center.
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definitions, a χ2 can be defined as
χ2 ≡
∑
i
(∑
j
pjiaj − si
)2
. (2)
The optimal values of ak are found where this χ
2 is minimized, i.e. by
solving
∂
∂ak
χ2 = 0 = 2
∑
i
(∑
j
pjiaj − si
)
pki. (3)
This expression can be rearranged and represented by the matrix equation
s = Pa, (4)
where sk =
∑
i
pkisi, Pkj =
∑
i
pkipji, and ak = ak. The solution
a = P−1s, (5)
is found via matrix inversion.
The scattering densities ak of each cask model element k are calculated
from the partial sinograms for the full cask and for each diversion scenario.
We compare the scattering densities in each diversion scenario aDiversionk to
those found for a full cask aFullk by showing their ratio in Fig. 6. A statistical
uncertainty is estimated by repeating the simulation and analysis with 10
independent simulation samples in each scenario; the standard deviation on
the ratio aDiversionk /a
Full
k found by comparing these data sets is shown as the
error bar on the points in Fig. 6.
The cast iron insert and copper shell (model elements 13 and 14, respec-
tively) are well constrained by the data, as evidenced by their relatively
small uncertainties since all muons that pass through the cask must pass
through these elements. One missing fuel bundle deviates from the expected
ratio by 102σ. For one half fuel bundle removed, the ratio deviates from
the expected value of one by 28σ. One missing fuel bundle replaced with
Pb rods deviates from the expected ratio by 5.1 σ. This demonstrates that
these diversion scenarios can be detected with 24 hours of muon scattering
data.
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Figure 6: The calculated ratio of scattering densities for each model element, for the
various diversion scenarios. The data points are offset slightly along the vertical axis for
clarity.
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4. Summary
There is a pressing need in international nuclear safeguards for a method
that is able to verify the contents of spent fuel casks before they are interred
in geological storage. Cosmic-ray muons provide a highly penetrating probe
than can access encapsulated fuel through shielding and emerge with useful
radiographic information. Here we have shown that 24 hours of measure-
ments of cosmic ray muon scattering in a geological storage cask are suffi-
cient to show if a fuel assembly has been removed, or replaced by a dummy
assembly made out of lead. We have used realistic models of the storage
cask, the nuclear fuel, and have applied angular resolution smearing to the
muon tracks to represent resolution in a detector that can be built with ex-
isting technology. Such an instrument could conceivably be built and used
to solve this problem in international nuclear safeguards.
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